Russia’s Quadcopter Express

Eric Woods, Research Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Note: CNS reviewed primary sources for findings originally reported by the Organized Crime and Corruption Report Project on diversion of quadcopters to the war in Ukraine. This public version of the article omits certain transactions and entities that appear to have a role in supplying quadcopters to Russia.

Drones have played a key role on both sides in the conflict in Ukraine. While much attention has focused on Ukraine’s acquisition of UAVs[1] from Turkey and Russia’s reliance on Iranian UAVs[2], less has been said about how small, mass market drones have been procured from the commercial market. Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), a Chinese mass producer of quadcopters and one of the world’s leading companies in quadcopters, has seen its products become ubiquitous as Ukrainian and Russian forces fight trench-by-trench for control of the country.

Figure 1:Quadcopter being launched on the battleground

Drones and quadcopters are instrumental for the kind of fighting currently taking place. Their cheap, disposable nature combined with sensors which can silently observe enemy movements assist both sides in identifying enemy positions for destruction by larger more complicated weapons. The price and relatively low-tech nature of quadcopters allow them to be used en masse.  Jamming, artillery fire and the cold climate means these items have short lives and are constantly replaced. Moreover, adding to their desirability and proliferation across the battlefield, commercial quadcopters can be used safely away from the front line. Flying the drones is as simple as throwing the drone in the air and guiding the drone with a game controller. A clip below from independent Ukrainian outlet Bihus shows Ukrainian troops using DJI’s Mavic series quadcopters to do just this:

Russia has struggled for over a decade to get a domestic drone program off the ground. Various institutes and entities have tried to fill this gap in Russia’s military capabilities, both in terms of developing quadcopters and larger UAVS.[3] In fact, due to the dearth of enterprises seemingly capable of manufacturing quadcopters at scale, Russian volunteer groups claim the Russian Ministry of Defense is partnering with them, both for the purposes of procuring commercial quadcopters for the Russian military, but also allegedly building them. One Telegram blog, “Drone Operator Chronicles”, released a video of masked volunteers the author claimed were building quadcopters for Russia’s airborne troops.[4]

Figure 2: Masked Volunteers Making Quadcopters

Nevertheless, as in the realm of microelectronics, Russia is highly dependent on commercially available, often non export controlled quadcopters to fulfill demand. And there is high demand.

In this scarcity, small and medium vendors with no record of importing quadcopters began importing massive quantities of quadcopters after the February 2022 invasion.

Figure 3: A small Moscow company imports almost one million dollars in primarily non-export controlled dual-use goods

In April 2022, three months into the war, DJI reportedly banned its products from being exported to Russia and Ukraine.[5] However, this does not seem to have prevented vendors and third parties from sending massive amounts of DJI quadcopters into the conflict zone. The widespread use of quadcopter drones by hobbyists and the fact they are not subject to export controls and are easily available via distributors makes cutting off the flow of these items nearly impossible. Sanctioned Russian entities—often military or security agency end-users, who are unable to procure goods directly on their own—can and do take advantage of these loopholes to maintain foreign inputs.

Data reviewed by CNS suggest DJI brand items are the bulk of the quadcopters being imported by Russia in the post invasion period. In one case, a Moscow-based company appears to have imported hundreds or thousands of dollars’ worth of Quadcopters from a company in Hong Kong.

Another trend CNS has observed in the data is for entities with a presence in both Russia and in third country jurisdictions to be involved in the supply of quadcopters to Russia. Such quadcopters are not normally controlled items, allowing them to be procured for ultimate use by the Russian military. Even when the manufacturer does not want what Russia euphemistically calls “parallel imports” occurring (parallel imports are imports to a country not condoned by the original manufacturer for legal or reputational reasons) sales go through.[6] This occurs across different varieties of controlled and uncontrolled dual-use items. In the example of drones, the case of “Celestial Mechanics”, a Russian company which imported large numbers of quadcopters, with many ultimately being sent to Russian military units, is a useful case study.

Journalists associated with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Network acquired post-invasion transaction records between the company and various “patriotic volunteer groups” supplying the Russian army in Ukraine.[7] The lack of reconnaissance drones has led various Russian fighters in Ukraine to ask for assistance in procuring DJI drones specifically. Telegram, the popular Russian messaging app, is filled with calls for assistance by individual and groups for money to buy DJI drones or for the drones themselves.[8], [9] Even state media has gotten into the DJI crowdfunding space, with one of Russia’s leading propagandists, Vladimir Solovyov, holding a telethon in conjunction with the “People’s Front” patriotic volunteer group to procure over 100 quadcopters for Russian fighters in the Donbas.[10]

CNS was able to at least partly corroborate some of this reporting on apparent DJI quadcopter trade to Russia. For much of 2022, a Russian company appears to have been able to acquire quadcopters from a DJI affiliate.

According to reporting from the OCCRP, the drones were then sent to the DJI Moscow branch and volunteer groups procuring quadcopters for the Russian army.[11] According to the journalists some of the drones sold by DJI Moscow are distributed on Russian e-commerce site Ozon, which is also used by Russian army units to procure quadcopters.[12]

There have been attempts to impose restrictions on the movement of sanctioned goods from Kazakhstan to Russia at the state level.[13] The question remains of whether or not it is feasible to prevent exports of uncontrolled goods from crossing borders inside an economic union. Since the first days of the war, Kazakhstan and other locales have become transshipment hubs for those looking to import restricted goods such as advanced industrial equipment for state companies.

The Eurasian Customs Union is a customs and economic union involving Russia and four of its most deeply economically integrated partner countries. These countries are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Of the members, only Belarus is under economic sanctions and pressure like Russia. The other members are non-belligerents in the war and do not face systematic sanctions. As such, and seen in the examples here and elsewhere, it appears to be relatively easy to export goods from the West to the Customs Union states and then divert them into Russia.[14]

But countries outside of Russia’s multilateral institutions also play a role in shipments of DJI quadcopters to Russia. For example, the United Arab Emirates is another route Russian entities seem to have used to procure DJI quadcopters post-invasion. Data examined by CNS suggests one entity shipped more than $2.9m of DJI products to Russia since February 2022.

Despite attempts to block Russia from foreign markets, the country continues to procure massive amounts of generally non export controlled drones using third party jurisdictions. Most telling of all, despite the nominal end of exports of DJI products to Russia, in 2023 the Directorate of Presidential Affairs, part of Putin’s office, still put out tenders for DJI copter parts.[15]